Th e increase in distributed generation and the pro-active role of consumers call for smarter networks. Consequently, regulation must change to promote this evolution.
INTRODUCTION
Both the massive development of renewable generation capacity connected to medium and low-voltage distribution networks and the launch of many smart-grid projects require a major change in network management. Medium-and low-voltage distribution networks have traditionally been passive infrastructures meant to Intersentia transport electricity from the transmission grid to end-users. However, the development of a low-carbon electricity sector requires Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to be able to infl uence generators' behavior and to off er ancillary services. Moreover, DSOs will have to ensure on behalf of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) the achievement of targeted standards of network operations.
To accomplish these changes successfully, DSOs are expected to undertake signifi cant investment. In particular, they will have to expand their network and improve its reliability, in order to accommodate the increased generation from renewable energy sources. Moreover, DSOs will have to deploy smart grids to encourage greater end-user participation, to foster greater market integration and to guarantee operational security (Jamasb and Marantes, 2011) .
Investment and innovation, though, may be perceived to contrast with the set of objectives that characterize standard incentive regulation, such as productive effi ciency, allocative effi ciency and service quality. Th is article provides a critical overview of the Italian regulation and the new regulatory period that has recently started (January 2012) in order to see whether the regulator has been able to cope with the aforementioned evolution.
Our qualitative analysis shows that Italian regulation has followed a continuous building-block approach: throughout diff erent regulatory periods the regulator has added new modules to its previous regulatory mechanism in order to respond to the constantly increasing set of objectives. For instance, revenue-cap regulation to stimulate productive effi ciency has subsequently been coupled with performancebased regulation for the quality of service. More recently, the regulator has introduced an input-based module for stimulating specifi c types of innovative investments. Th e building block approach characterizes not only the Italian regulation but also that of Finland, Greece, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, where the regulation of the distribution activity is a combination of cost plus, incentive-based, and revenue/price cap mechanisms. However, the peculiarity of the Italian regulation stands in the overlapping of diff erent incentive schemes, which duplicates incentives for the achievement of the same goal. For instance, this is the case for the reduction of network losses, which are incentivized both with performance-based regulation and with an extra-remuneration for investments aimed at reducing outages and network losses. Among countries with a building block approach, Italy is the only one adopting an investment incentive for certain type of network intervention (Ey, 2010) . In addition, the regulatory framework still has some fi nancial fl aws concerning the defi nition of the capital remuneration that hinder investments, irrespective of the diff erent blocks.
Th e article is structured as follows: section 2 describes the Italian electricity distribution sector and the main features of the regulation adopted during the fi rst regulatory period. Section 3 discusses the evolution of Italian regulation during the second and third regulatory periods and their impact on the distribution activity. Section 4 then discusses the eff ects of Italian regulation on network investments and smart-grid pilot projects. Section 5 concludes.
THE ITALIAN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SECTOR: THE BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST REGULATORY PERIOD
In Italy, electricity distribution is an unbundled activity licensed by local municipalities: this means that there are more than 8,000 license areas. At present, there are approximately 140 operators of extremely uneven size. ENEL Distribuzione is the main distributor, serving around 86% of the Italian market, followed by A2A Reti Elettriche (4%), Acea Distribuzione (3.4%) and Aem Torino Distribuzione (1.3%); all the remaining operators are extremely small local utilities and in some municipalities there is still in-house public provision.
Since the so-called Bersani Decree of 1999 -the law that has liberalized the electricity sector -distribution is a fully regulated business. Among their responsibilities, the DSOs have legal duties to maintain and develop economic, effi cient and coordinated distribution networks. Moreover, they have to guarantee the reliable supply of electricity, promptly restore power in the event of outages, and connect new end users and local generators to their network quickly and effi ciently.
Soon aft er the liberalization, an intense wave of restructuring hit the distribution sector. Th e restructuring process was mainly driven by the requirement that there be one licensee per municipality. Th is clause aimed at streamlining a confused situation whereby many big cities had a plurality of distributors. Th e requirement was designed so that the incumbent, ENEL Distribuzione, had to sell its assets in favor of any counterpart operating in the same municipality and willing to buy them. Over the period 2000 to 2007, ENEL Distribuzione lost almost 2 million delivery points in favor of small and medium-sized local public utilities. 1 At the beginning of the liberalization process, service quality and continuity of supply were a major concern. In particular, continuity levels were far from EU standards and extremely geographically uneven (Ajodhia et al. 2006 ). As we shall discuss, this concern has deeply infl uenced the fi rst two regulatory periods as, contrary to many other EU regulators, the Italian authority immediately addressed both quality and investment issues by setting a strong incentive mechanism.
In Italy, an independent regulator (Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gashenceforth AEEG) was established in 1995, with Law no. 481/1995. Th e fi rst comprehensive regulation of electricity transportation and distribution was introduced in 2000. In accordance with international best practices, AEEG introduced 1 Basically, ENEL Distribuzione was forced to leave the biggest Italian cities such as Rome, Milan, Turin and Bologna.
Intersentia a revenue-cap mechanism on both OPEX and CAPEX with an X-effi ciency level of 4%. First-year revenues were set on the basis of historical costs. Since 2000, the length of each regulatory period has been set at four years.
In order to stimulate quality improvements and continuity of supply, AEEG introduced a specifi c performance-based regulation. National standards on continuity were introduced and distribution companies were expected at least to meet them. Th ese national reference standards were measured in terms of the annual average minutes of interruption per customer (SAIDI index) and varied geographically as a function of customer density. Distribution companies outperforming those standards received a reward, while those underperforming suff ered a penalty. Th e system did not provide for a cap and collar mechanism and the reward/penalty was on average around 18€ per kWh of non-supplied energy. It is interesting to notice that the nature of the reward was not conceived as a prize, but as a specifi c accelerated amortization allowance on quality-related investments. As most of the quality improvements were related to CAPEX additions, the option to grant an accelerated amortization allowance on those specifi c investments gave distributors the possibility to repay investments faster and so get a tax advantage, as the higher write-off resulted in reductions of the taxable income.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATION: THE SUBSEQUENT PERIODS
In 2004 the second regulatory period began. Th e regulation conceived for this second period is, with some adjustments, still valid today. A move from the fi rst regulatory period was necessary for two reasons. During the fi rst regulatory period, the regulation of transportation and distribution were not clearly separated, and distribution costs were regulated within the price for non-eligible customers; given the pace of liberalization, this regulatory framework was not adequate anymore. Secondly, law no. 290/2003 expressly obliged AEEG to apply diff erent regulatory mechanisms for OPEX and CAPEX: a revenue-cap for the former, and a rate of return for the latter. Given this constraint, AEEG introduced a revenue-cap regulation based on historical costs for operative expenditures (including amortization) and a standard rate of return (RoR) regulation on CAPEX, whereby capital additions performed in year n are checked by the regulator in year n+1 and added to the Regulatory Asset Value (RAV) in year n+2. On average, OPEX and amortization in the Italian distribution sector account for 60% of all allowed revenues: as such, almost 40% of the revenues are safeguarded, as we shall discuss later on, from any effi ciency mechanism. Th e second regulatory period also moved to a more standardized tariff structure to translate allowed revenues into unitary tariff s. Before, tariff s were proposed by DSOs and approved by AEEG. Since the second regulatory period, AEEG has introduced a limited set of tariff s -which have been then simplifi ed further in subsequent regulatory periods -in order to harmonize distribution costs at a national level. Th e new harmonized system foresees that tariff s have to be conceived according to a set of parameters (i.e. customer density, type of customers, etc.), which are then standardized in a few categories (for instance high, medium and low customer density). Th e consequence of this tariff structure is that distributors operating in contexts signifi cantly diff erent from the standardized categories may earn less or more than they are entitled to. Th erefore, an equalization mechanism has been introduced by AEEG so that DSOs with a positive diff erence between allowed and actual revenues can compensate those with a negative diff erence.
As anticipated above, the regulatory backbone in periods 3 and 4 has remained the same. As we shall discuss in more detail below, the major innovation has been the introduction of input-based elements combined with an increase in the rate of return applied to specifi c types of investment, and mainly designed to facilitate the hosting of renewable capacity on distribution networks. Th e fourth regulatory period began in January 2012 and will end in December 2015. Below we will discuss the main feature of Italian regulation over the last two periods.
THE RPI-X ON OPEX
Since 2004, the Italian regulator has adopted a revenue-cap regulation for OPEX to promote productive and allocative effi ciency. Table 1 illustrates the X-effi ciency factor set by AEEG over the period 2004-2011, as well as the resulting RPI-X parameter, when the average yearly Retail Price Index is considered. As we can see from Table 1 , the X-effi ciency factor has reduced over subsequent regulatory periods. Given the value of the yearly average infl ation rate, we observe that the effi ciency gains to be translated to end-customers (the RPI-X parameter) progressively reduced over time until 2010, when an increase in DSOs' tariff s appears to have been allowed. Generally, the application of this incentive mechanism seems to have been successful. Indeed, the component of the household tariff relative to network management costs has constantly reduced over time (see Figure 1) . Indeed, while it represented 26% of the household tariff in 2004, in 2011 it accounted for only 15% of the total costs borne by end-customers. Network cost component as % of total household tariff Source: Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas.
ROR REGULATION ON CAPEX

Capital remuneration
Notwithstanding the importance of diff erent types of regulation and incentive schemes, Helm (2009) and Cambini and Rondi (2010) estimate that the most important stimulus to investment is the allowed return on capital. In this paragraph we will consequently focus our attention on how capital remuneration is set. In Italy, the Regulatory Asset Value consists of the sum of historical charges, capital expenditure additions and the net working capital (set at 1% of all the capital assets included in the RAV). In this respect it does not diff er from other regulations. Th e amortization percentages for industry specifi c assets are similar to those in the UK, Germany, and France. Compared to many other regulatory regimes, the Italian system has two peculiarities with respect to CAPEX additions: (i) investments are added to the RAV two years later; (ii) remuneration for year n is defi ned by multiplying the rate of return by the RAV for year n net of the depreciation for the same year.
Th e fi rst peculiarity stems from a backward-looking approach -which has traditionally characterized Italian regulation -and the diff erent timing between tariff setting and balance sheet approval. Tariff s are approved at the beginning of each year n; balance sheets for the year n -1 are, however, sent for approval between April and June of the same year n. As such, tariff s in year n + 1 will be based on balance sheet data referring to year n -1, causing a non-trivial problem in remunerating the investments. To exemplify things, we show a simple "back-of-the-envelopecalculation". Let's consider an investment of 100, whose lifetime is equal to 1 year and the capital remuneration to 5% (used also as the discount factor). According to the backward-looking approach of the Italian regulation, the investment is performed in n -1, but it is amortized and remunerated only in n + 1. Th is backward-looking approach returns a net present value of -5. A forward-looking approach, instead, where investments are added in year n according to budgetary data, would return a 0 net present value. Th e second peculiarity is just a fi nancial mistake that worsens the situation just described. Capital remuneration of any year n should, in fact, be calculated gross of the amortization of the year (as we have done in our example in table 1). As shown in Newbery (1997) , the theory of accounting states that an asset, costing K at date n=0 and that produces a fl ow of gross returns g n ceasing at date N, at any date n has a present value equal to the discounted sum (at a rate r) of its remaining returns so that:
Intersentia Th e amortization of an asset is simply its fall in value over its lifetime; diff erentiating [1], we obtain the instantaneous rate of amortization (A n ):
From equation [2] it can be derived that:
Which means that the gross return is made up of the return on the capital value at the beginning of each period, rV n , plus the amortization A n . On the contrary, AEEG defi nes equation g n as follows:
Equation [4] implies that the asset value at any date n is no longer consistent with its time and path of amortization, as would instead result from [3] . Moreover, given that ex-ante the allowed rate of return and the discount rate are the same, if the regulator wants the new investment to yield zero net present value (NPV) to the shareholders, then it has to fi x the RAV at time 0 (V 0 ) equal to the investment cost K and not, as AEEG presently does, equal to K -A 1 ; this in fact results in the NPV being negative.
Th e above situation means that no matter the return decided by AEEG and the methodology adopted to set it, the determination of the initial RAV might distort investment decisions: in fact, in order to obtain an NPV equal to 0, a DSO must achieve an actual return on the investment signifi cantly higher than the allowed return. Th ere are basically two possibilities to achieve this (which, of course, cannot confl ict): either having a capital cost, and in particular a debt cost, signifi cantly lower than that allowed or, alternatively, having an attractive performance-based scheme.
To overcome this situation in part, in the fourth regulatory period, AEEG has decided to grant an extra remuneration of +1% on the allowed return to any new investment. For operators, this is obviously better than the previous situation, but the only way to correct the problem fully would be to eliminate both peculiarities.
As for capital remuneration, AEEG uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model approach. Table 2 shows the evolution of the allowed Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) in all the regulatory periods.
Th e allowed remuneration has constantly increased, in particular from the fi rst to the second period. Th is is due to a slight change in the setting of the risk free rate (RFR) and to the drastic change in the beta value. As for the RFR, in the fi rst period it was set equal to the 1-year trailing average of the yield of the Italian 3-year Government bonds, while in subsequent periods it has been set equal to the 1-year trailing average of the yield of the Italian 10-year Government bonds, measured the year before the beginning of the new regulatory period. Source: Authors' elaboration on the data provided by Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas.
Th e drastic change in the beta value is due to the fact that in 2000 it was almost impossible to fi nd comparable data, at least in Europe, as most of the utilities and energy companies were still integrated. By contrast, from the second period onwards, a consistent number of energy network companies were listed throughout the world and comparisons became easier. Th ere are two reasons for the change in the ratio between debt and equity. First, the beta coeffi cient results from a linear regression analysis of the returns of a portfolio (normally the stock index) versus the return of an individual asset (in our case the returns of a listed company). As such, the beta coeffi cient captures the risk premium of the company as a whole, which is fi nanced both by equity and debt (and that explains why it is called beta levered2). Making a market comparison thus also means that the Debt/Equity structure ought to be replicated. Second, increased gearing should push investments and lower their fi nancing costs.
Finally, and contrary for instance to the UK, taxes are not given a separate allowance, but their relative weight is included in the estimation of the WACC. Th is means that non-deductible costs can signifi cantly impact the actual return, as they cannot be recovered with a specifi c allowance.
In the graph below, we show: (i) black line (spread 1) -the yearly average of the spread between the RFR and the yield of the 10-year Government bonds; and (ii) grey line (spread 2) -the spread between the cost of debt set for each regulatory period and 2 Th e beta unlevered results from the following equation:
. the average cost of debt for ENEL Distribuzione. Th e spread between the RFR and the yield of the 10-year Government bonds has varied substantially: its mean value has been at around 43 basis points (bps), while its standard deviation has been close to 31 bps. Since the RFR is beyond managerial control, and since it can be quite volatile, we think that the regulator should either review it annually, or index DSOs' tariff s not only for the RPI-X, but also for the variation of the yield of the 10-year Government bond chosen as the RFR (see Braley and Franks, 2009 ). Moreover, the indexation would also guarantee the headroom that AEEG has constantly tried to leave, whenever setting the RFR, as it seems to place a greater weight upon the risk of underinvestment. Th is reduction shows that the average cost of debt for ENEL Distribuzione has risen close to the marginal cost of debt set by the regulator. Th is might be linked to the signifi cant amount of investments made in the fi rst two periods (see Figure 4 , p. 22) and it might also partially explain the slowdown in the third period. For the present period, as fi nancial markets are under particular stress, as explained above, AEEG has decided to revise the RFR and the WACC in two years. Even though it cannot be considered a strong move towards indexation, it seems nonetheless the only correct decision the regulator has taken amidst signifi cant fi nancial misinterpretations.
Open issue: RoR regulation and effi cient capital spending
It is well known that a RoR regime does not give any cost-effi ciency incentives (on this issue Joskow, 2008; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007) . Clearly, AEEG cannot modify this rule, as Law 290/2003 expressly requires AEEG to apply a RoR for CAPEX.
A possible solution to introduce effi ciency elements would be to move towards an ex-ante approval of investments. At present distributors make investment decisions on electricity distribution networks. AEEG intervenes only ex-post by checking the actual deployment of these investments. Each year the regulator updates distribution tariff s to take into account the actual changes in the invested capital.
Th e literature does not provide any evidence about whether a backward-looking rather than a forward-looking approach fosters or hinders investments. However, we believe that a move towards a forward-looking approach -whereby distributors have to present investment plans for approval -would oblige operators to justify in advance their capital expenditures and would help the regulator in setting performance targets. Of course, investment costs would have to be recovered anyway (so a menu of contracts like the one adopted in the UK could not be introduced), but this would at least give more predictability and a need to justify diff erences between actual and foreseen expenditures. Moreover, planning and appropriate price signals would ease the problem of accommodating distributed generation (DG), by coordinating DG installations and network upgrades (Niesten, 2010) . Given the signifi cant number of DSOs operating in the Italian electricity distribution sector, the ex-ante requirement of a business plan would dramatically increase regulatory costs. We argue, therefore, that an asymmetric regulatory approach could be adopted. For example, by applying the EU Directive 2009/72, a diff erent treatment for DSOs according to their size (i.e. number of customers served) might be applied. Specifi cally, AEEG might adopt a forward-looking approach only for the DSOs with a number of customers above a given threshold. For DSOs characterized as small (i.e. having fewer customers than this threshold), the current regulatory approach might continue to apply. German regulation, for example, is basically a revenue-cap regulation characterized by a DEA-based benchmarking to set the effi ciency improvement factor. According to the German Incentive Regulation 3 DSOs with fewer than 30,000 customers connected directly or indirectly to their distribution system -and which are under the supervision of the State Regulatory Authorities 4 -can choose to be subjected to a simplifi ed regulatory procedure with reference to the defi nition of the effi ciency factor (Cullman, 2012) . Th e German New Electricity Act, entered into force in 2005, establishes -according to the Directive 2009/72/EC -that DSOs serving more than 100,000 customers must be subjected to the supervision of BNetzA. Th e Federal Network Agency has to ensure non-discriminatory access to the network, prevent anti-competitive behavior from DSOs, and monitor regulation concerning DSOs unbundling. By contrast, State Regulatory Agencies are responsible for DSOs having fewer than 100,000 customers and connected to their electricity network and whose grid does not extend beyond a federal state's border.
Intersentia
QUALITY AND CONTINUITY IMPROVEMENTS
From the second period onwards, quality regulation has changed dramatically. First, a cap and collar mechanism has been introduced within the system. Moreover, the reward/penalty system is now based on a willingness to pay (WTP) approach: AEEG surveys fi nal customers to derive a utility function needed to set monetary values for rewards and penalties. Th e WTP approach results in decreasing marginal rewards attached to quality and continuity improvements, according to a standard concave utility function.
As discussed by Ajodhia et al. (2006) , Fumagalli et al. (2007) and Fumagalli and Lo Schiavo (2009) , quality regulation, at least in terms of performance, has been a success. Below, we show the sharp reduction in the minutes lost per customer (the SAIDI index). Th e major gains were made in the fi rst regulatory period, where minutes lost per customer dropped from more than 120 to less than 60. Th e second period brought about another signifi cant reduction, as in 2008 the index dropped to 50. Th e third period has experienced another reduction, even though it seems clear that further improvements are much more diffi cult to attain. Source: Authors' elaboration on data from Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas.
Losses
AEEG sets standard values for losses occurring on electricity distribution networks and establishes a performance-based regulation through which it rewards distributors if actual losses are lower than the baseline, and penalizes them otherwise. Specifi cally, the incentive mechanism is such that each DSO bears the diff erence (positive or negative) between the actual losses incurred, and the targeted losses set by regulation.
In the present period, the loss target for electricity fl owing from medium to lowvoltage networks is equal to 10.4% of injected electricity, while for fl ows from high to medium-voltage networks it is set at 4.7%. In other words, this means that to deliver 100 kWh to end customers, a plant connected to a high-voltage network is considered to have injected 115.1 kWh. Th is mechanism considers that no losses occur if injection and withdrawal occur at the same voltage: in an era of increasing DG this mechanism penalizes DSOs. In May 2012, this situation was solved, aft er a one year evaluation process, with the defi nition of loss factors generated by the interaction between distributed generation and the electricity networks: (i) 2.4%, if the injection point is situated at a medium-voltage level: (ii) 5.1% if the injection point is situated at a lowvoltage level.
Th e performance-based regulation on losses seems to have achieved positive results: network losses are characterized by a decreasing trend over time. Indeed, from 2000 actual network losses in Italy reduced by 6%.
Given that losses will be a major issue as DG increases, in the third regulatory period AEEG also introduced specifi c input-based incentives (in the form of 1.5% extra remuneration) to stimulate investments needed to reduce losses even further, namely: (i) construction of new high-voltage/medium-voltage power transformation stations; (ii) replacement of the existing power transformation stations of medium/ low-voltage transformation cabins, with new low-loss transformation stations; (iii) renewal and development of medium-voltage networks in historic centers.
As we shall discuss below, this is one of the overlapping blocks of the Italian regulation.
INNOVATION
Since the third regulatory period, innovative investments have received an extraremuneration above the standard WACC. For these investments, DSOs have to present a project three years in advance illustrating costs, timing and expected outcomes. In particular, a 2% extra-remuneration is granted for twelve years for the following kinds of investments realized during the regulatory period 2012-2015: (i) investments designed to develop automation, protection and control systems for medium voltage smart grids; (ii) pilot projects concerning the installation of batteries. In the latter case, the extra-remuneration occurs if, and only if, investments for the realization of batteries are included in pilot projects for smart grids, and aim to ensure the injection into the grid of electricity produced by intermittent renewable resources.
Th e assignment of an extra-remuneration to investments in smart grids and batteries is decided ex-ante by a commission of experts appointed by the Italian regulator. Th e commission selects those smart-grid pilot projects found to be the best performing with reference to a given set of criteria. For each project the so-called Priority Index is computed:
P smart (MWh) 5 represents the increase in DG-produced electricity as a consequence of the realization of the smart project: A j are the project benefi ts; C is the cost of the project (€). Th is is a synthetic indicator used to assess the expected performance of a smart-grid pilot project with reference to its development costs (for a detailed discussion of the selection of smart grid pilot projects see Lo Schiavo et al. 2011) . Specifi cally, the expected benefi ts of each pilot project are evaluated with reference to four areas of performance: (i) the size of the project: e.g. the number of active users involved, the size of the area covered by the pilot project, and the extent to which the project increases the production from RES and DG; (ii) the feasibility of the project: the timing of the project and its impact on the quality of supply; (iii) the innovative content of the project: e.g. the ability to aggregate DG and renewable energy aimed at voltage regulation, the uniformity of the diagram-production use of the communication systems, or control and management of distribution networks; (iv) the replicability of the project: this refers to the reproducibility on a large scale of the technical solutions proposed in the demo projects. For each of the four criteria a score is assigned to each project. Specifi cally, criterion (i) may take a value ranging from 6 to 30; criterion (ii) may range from 4 to 10; criterion (iii) may vary from a score of 6 to a score of 40 points; criterion (iv) may range from 2 to 20 points. Each project may be assigned a value (up to a maximum of 100 points) according to the benefi ts it is deemed to produce for the system. Th e scores obtained are then weighted by means of a normalization coeffi cient to account for projects of diff erent sizes. Th e amount thus obtained is then divided by the cost of the project to obtain the fi nal value of the Priority Index.
As specifi ed above, authorized projects are included in the RAV and receive an extra remuneration; as such only end-users attached to the distribution grids of the winning DSOs will bear the costs of innovative projects. For instance, Ofgem set up a similar mechanism, the Low Carbon Network Fund, which decides the winning projects in a similar way, but money is then collected from all end-users.
5
Specifi cally, P smart is defi ned as follows:
EIpost − EIpre _____________ 8760 where EI post is the DG-produced electricity that can be injected into the network aft er the project (MWh) and EI pre is the DG-produced electricity that can be injected into the network before the project (MWh). 
OPEN ISSUES: PERFORMANCE AND INPUT INCENTIVES
As we have seen, Italian incentive regulation has mainly been about performance incentives. From 2007, though, AEEG has introduced specifi c input incentives on some investments, which might result in remunerating the same behavior more than once.
Apart from the risk of providing DSOs with a double incentive for the same behavior, we believe that regulation should address three major issues in order to give DSOs better investment signals: (i) the (risk of) overlap between performance incentives and RoR regulation; (ii) the regulation on losses which combines both input and performance incentives; and (iii) the need to defi ne performance outputs for a low-carbon sector.
On the fi rst two points, we have already noted that Italian regulation adopts specifi c performance incentives for commercial quality, continuity of supply and for losses; performance incentives are designed to counterbalance possible quality reductions driven by the presence of cost-effi ciency regulation, such as a revenue-cap (see, for instance, Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, 2010) . In Italy, cost effi ciency is incentivized only for OPEX, and, as such, reward/penalty systems should be designed only for those performances (totally) dependent on operative expenditures. Unfortunately, this might be true only for commercial quality.
As we have already seen, performance with respect to continuity and losses depends heavily on both OPEX and CAPEX. In Italy, both issues have been top priorities for the regulator, which has accepted the introduction of a performancebased scheme, notwithstanding the fact that part of those investment costs would have been recovered anyway.
Unlike 12 years ago, quality and continuity levels are now comparable to EU standards and the scheme should be updated. In this respect, we think that investment plans linked to performance targets would help the regulator in disentangling the part of the performance dependent on CAPEX additions from the part dependent on OPEX, in order better to conceive performance indexes and incentives only related to OPEX.
As for the third point, pilot projects incentivized with input-based mechanism will likely off er the possibility of shaping output targets for the next regulatory periods.
THE IMPACT OF THE REGULATION ON NETWORK INVESTMENTS AND SMART-GRID PILOT PROJECTS
NETWORK INVESTMENTS
Th e sharp improvement in quality (the reduction in both the duration of outages and network losses) that occurred over the fi rst two regulatory periods could be related to the investments made during the same period. As shown in Figure 4 , network investments undertaken by ENEL Distribuzione follow a decreasing pattern over time, similar to that followed by the SAIDI index and network losses: network investments concentrate to a noticeable extent over the period 2000-2007, then signifi cantly reduce. Th e third period, indeed, experienced a signifi cant slowdown in CAPEX additions. For instance, ENEL Distribuzione reduced its investments by almost 35%. In principle, this is neither positive nor negative: investments do not need to be constant over time, just as they do not need to show a strictly increasing trend.
Quality and continuity rules stimulated investments, at least in the fi rst two periods. As demonstrated, investments were crucial to attaining signifi cant quality improvements. In addition, a clear positive correlation emerges between the dynamics of network investments and improvements in the continuity of the provided service. Th e correlation coeffi cient between yearly investments and the reduction in the amount of minutes lost is equal to 0.70 and it is statistically signifi cant. At the same time, it is diffi cult to say whether the amount of CAPEX was optimal, or the combined eff ect of quality incentives and RoR regulation resulted in overinvestment. Making some simple calculations, it can only be said that the average cost per customer was signifi cantly lower than the WTP. Its average value, in fact, was estimated at 36 €cent/kW/min up to 75 minutes lost and at 24 €cent/kW/min up to 25 minutes lost. As such, the value of the 70 minute drop in the fi rst regulatory period was, on average, 22.6 €/customer/year; the value of the 20 minute drop in the second period, instead, was, on average, 5.4 €/customer/year. According to Fumagalli and Lo Schiavo (2009) 
INVESTING IN INNOVATION PROJECTS
In the previous regulatory period, eight demonstration projects for smart grids were selected by AEEG. Half of the awarded projects were presented by the main Italian DSOs (ACE, A2A, and ENEL Distribuzione), while smaller distributors presented the remaining selected projects. In Table 4 (below) we report for eight selected projects out of nine, in 2010, on their cost and their relative benefi t in terms of the maximum generation that it is possible to identify aft er the development of the project above the minimum load threshold with no network expansion (i.e. the situation before the development of the project). Th e projects share common characteristics in terms of size, technological solutions adopted (e.g. a bidirectional communication system; the development of possibilities for the future participation of DSOs in the ancillary service market; the development of possibilities for recharging electric vehicles), and specifi c features concerning the type of environment in which the project will be developed (rural or urban).
Th e total value of the selected smart-grid projects amounts to about € 16.5 million. Th is value is well below the yearly amount that UK distributors are allowed to spend on innovative projects (chosen by a selection process similar to the Italian one), which stands at almost £80 million. Moreover, it should be noted that municipalities have proposed all of the selected projects. Th erefore, in order to make incentives for innovation by public institutions eff ective and to avoid the diversion of public money, it is important that grid companies receiving funds should: (i) receive sanctions in case of lack of delivery of the project; (ii) be obliged "to make the research results publicly available" (Meeus and Saguan, 2011) ; (iii) be forced to maintain "the technologies that are developed" as "nonproprietary" (Meeus and Saguan, 2011) . In addition, almost all the presented projects (eight out of nine) were selected in 2010. Th erefore, the low value of the selected pilot projects -if compared to the yearly amount that UK distributors are allowed to spend on innovative projects -is likely to be attributable to the low level of participation of DSOs in the tender, rather than to a limited budget set ex-ante by the Italian Regulator. Th is trend seems to be unchanged for 2011. 6
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY DISCUSSION
In this article we have discussed the main characteristics of Italian regulation. Our qualitative analysis shows that it has followed a continuous building-block approach: throughout diff erent regulatory periods, the regulator has added new modules to its previous regulatory mechanism in order to respond to the constantly increasing set of objectives. For instance, the revenue-cap regulation to stimulate productive effi ciency was later coupled with performance-based regulation of the quality of the service. More recently, the regulator has introduced an input-based module for stimulating specifi c innovative investments. As we have shown, this approach seems to have eff ectively stimulated investments to improve continuity and reduce losses. Th is building block approach, though, does not give DSOs a unitary and coherent regulatory framework and has also led to overlap between diff erent incentive mechanisms. Th is overlap, together with fi nancial fl aws aff ecting the defi nition of the capital remuneration and the lack of effi ciency mechanisms for capital spending, might hinder the accomplishment of a low-carbon electricity sector. In particular, the Italian regulator should correct the discussed fl aws in the defi nition of the WACC; moreover it should consider indexing the RFR and moving towards a standardized framework (Dobbs, 2008) to increase the level of consistency across sectors, as AEEG has recently been given the powers to regulate water utilities as well.
Moreover, we think it is desirable to promote a forward-looking approach -in the form of investment plans -to encourage appropriate capital spending by DSOs. To this end, we suggest the adoption of asymmetric regulation based on the size of the DSOs: precisely, we argue that DSOs with a large number of end-customers should be subject to the submission of a business plan illustrating the investments they intend to perform. For small DSOs the current approach might continue to be used. On one hand, investment plans would give at least a reputational incentive for effi ciency; on the other hand, they would help AEEG to reshape the performance-based block of the 6 As of March 31 2011 ten pilot projects had been submitted, and in May 2011 the project evaluation phase was completed (Lo Schiavo et al. 2011) . However, the results of the evaluation procedure are not yet publicly available. regulation, as investment plans linked to performance targets would help the regulator in disentangling the part of the performance dependent on CAPEX additions from the part dependent on OPEX, in order better to conceive performance indexes and incentives only related to OPEX. Th is would help solve the problem of overlapping incentives characterizing some aspects of Italian regulation, like those concerning losses and innovative investments.
